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I.

INTRODUCTION

Business transactions are the reasons for contracts. Risk in
transactions is more about uncertainty in fulfilling the transaction, on both
sides, as the businesspeople see it, than blame shifting at the end, as the
lawyers see it. The contract is to support a transaction. The risks in the
transaction are multiple and multidimensional risks, some of which can be
planned for, as contingencies; others not, as exigencies. The transactional
risks, as I call them here, should be the underlying purpose for how we
draft the contract using the drafting techniques of representations,
warranties, conditions, covenants, defaults, and rights.
This is different than the typical legal drafting approach to deal with
the two risks that lawyers know, a first-party risk of failure to perform, and
a third-party risk of harms to third-parties resulting in liability to the
contracting party. These are contractual risks, dealt with through the
ominous and omnibus indemnity section. Most lawyers deal with
contractual risks because they have learned about contractual risks from
reading cases about contract breaches and contract losses, and because
they usually do not really understand the business process. Thus, the
drafting techniques of representations, etc., are sorted into slots in the
contract, perhaps not really relevant to the transaction, though they are
loaded to trigger blame and indemnity when the performance fails. The
contract ought to specifically address contract risks and ought generally to
accommodate transactional risks.
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The title here has evolved from the title at my presentation of this conference, “Contract
Drafting and Risk Shifting in the Transaction: More than an Indemnity Paragraph.”
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The suggestion here is to view the contract as supporting the business
process and dealing with the various uncertainties of transactional risks,
rather than the contract being the cause and purpose of the transaction. A
business perspective, and an understanding of the business process, is
therefore important in drafting the contract to address transactional risks.
This paper develops the thesis of transactional risk and contractual
risk accommodation for drafting contracts using several domains:
relational contracts, enterprise risk management, options and the theory
of incomplete contracts; the expanding role of inhouse counsel in applying
the forgoing, contract management and its evolving counterpart
contractual management;1 and the inadequacies of the typical indemnity
provisions drafted by lawyers to address transactional risk. These domains
can inform contract drafting and how to teach contract drafting beyond
technical aspects.
II.

IS THE POINT A TRANSACTION OR A CONTRACT?

Business transactions are the reasons for contracts. A desired
business transaction generates a contract; a contract does not generate a
transaction,2 although the absence of a contract may delay the transaction.
For businesspeople, the contract (if they have one, and if it really applies,
and if they follow it, which are all too frequently lacunae in the
transaction),3 is about implementing the transaction. The transactions
might be singular, to obtain a service or a product in a single transaction;
these may be called spot contracts, and these are the epitome of classical
contract theory that looks to a contract.4 The transactions might be
prolonged, for repetitive or multiple services or delivery of multiple goods
over an extended period, or due to the time to accomplish a singular
service or to manufacture a good; these reflect an ongoing relationship
between the parties, later encompassed in the studies and theory of

Ralph Schuhmann & Bert Eichhorn, From Contract Management to Contractual Management,
11 EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1 (2015).

1

The classical doctrines of contract law were “purely, or almost purely, objective. . . .
Classical contract law carried objectivism so far that it overrode the actual shared
intentions of the parties,” even to the point that a contract could be formed that did not
reflect the intentions of either party. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Symposium on Law in the
Twentieth Century: The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 88 CALIF. L. REV 1743, 1754–57
(2000).

2

Stewart Macaulay, Symposium: Law, Private Governance and Continuing Relationships: An
Empirical View of Contract, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 465, 467 (1985).

3

D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King, Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 4–
6 (2009).

4
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relational contracts, discussed below.5 Thus transactions run a spectrum
from discrete to relational, as Smith and King say,6 and (similarly) static to
dynamic reflecting the past, present and future of the transaction, as
Eisenberg says.7
The business perspective is to implement the transaction, which may
also be fulfilling a contract.8 For businesspeople, the contract is the
scaffold to regulate the transaction; it is not the transactional edifice itself.
No one enters into a contract without some underlying purpose. “Business
people often do not plan, exhibit great care in drafting contracts, pay much
attention to those that lawyers carefully draft, or honor a legal approach
to business relationships.”9 In fact, the transaction may be ongoing, yet
the contract may be incomplete in describing the transaction—thus the
place for gap-filling remedies of Uniform Commercial Code Article 210
and for the various common law fixes of common counts (quantum
meruit, quasi- or implied contract, etc.) applied post-loss to splint a
transaction that lacked a contract up front.11 Or contracts are patched on
5

Id.

6

Id. at 9.

7 Eisenberg, supra note 2, at 1762, 1748–49 (“A contract law doctrine lies at the static pole
if its application turns entirely on what occurred at the moment in time when a contract
was formed. A contract law doctrine lies at the dynamic pole if its application turns in
significant part on a moving stream of events that precedes, follow, or constitutes the
formation of a contract.”).

Sonja A. Soehnel, Annotation, What Constitutes a Transaction, a Contract for Sale, or a Sale
Within the Scope of UCC Article 2, 4 A.L.R.4th 85 (1981) (discussing and collecting cases
explaining that a contract for the sale of goods is one type of transaction).
8

9

Macaulay, supra note 3, at 467.

10 See Apex v. Sharing World, Inc., 206 Cal. App. 4th 999, 1011 (2012) (“[t]he Uniform
Commercial Code provides gap fillers to cover time and place of payment and delivery
when those terms are not expressed in the parties' agreement.” (citing WHITE &
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 3-5, 3-7 (2006))); Bethlehem Steel Corp. v.
Litton Indus., 468 A.2d 748, 766–67 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982) (“The intent of the Code, as
clearly expressed by 13 Pa.C.S.A. § 2204(c), is to preserve a contract and fill in any gaps,
‘if the parties have intended to make a contract and there is a reasonably certain basis for
giving an appropriate remedy.’”); Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of Silence: Default Rules and
Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REV. 821, 870 (1992); Timothy E. Travers, Annotation,
Construction and Application of UCC § 2-305 Dealing with Open Price Term Contracts, 91 A.L.R.
3d 1237 (1979). But see Allen R. Kamp, Downtown Code: A History of the Uniform Commercial
Code 1949-1954, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 359, 475 (2001).
11 7 C.J.S. Action of Assumpsit § 2 (2018). “General assumpsit is an action of assumpsit
brought upon the promise or contract implied by law in certain instances. In this form
of action, plaintiff ignores the express undertaking, if any, and grounds the action on an
implied contract springing from a consideration received. In general assumpsit, the court,
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after the deal is underway to memorialize an undertaking, thus “deeming”
the contract effective on a date prior to execution. Or contracts are
ambiguous or contradictory when badly drafted, sometimes because the
contract form is misapplied, or the contract is cribbed from bits of other
bad contract forms that never are properly fitted and blended to the
transaction. Or contracts are skeletons that are given shape and body later
by amendments, policies and procedures, memorandums of
understanding, change orders, purchase orders based on a master contract,
and sometimes only by an invoice. “Because contracts always evolve, or at
least may always evolve, interpretation should take account of the way in
which the parties live and grow their contracts.”12
Businesspeople see risk in transactions as uncertainty in fulfilling the
transaction going forward. It is an anticipatory risk. Can we do what we
are agreeing to do? What resources (labor, capital, time, licenses, suppliers,
materials, skills, management) do we need to accomplish that, what
obstacles and other conflicts are there to obtaining those resources? What
downsides exist? What other opportunities do we forego, or opportunities
will these lead to? The same questions are asked of the other side’s ability
and commitment, which leads to protective questions of what if other side
does not perform as planned.
Lawyers, on the other hand, tend to see risk in transactions as
contractual risks that lead to breach, blame, and therefore blame-shifting,
including liability due to breach or other defective performance. For
lawyers, the contract is the transaction: the contract they write provides
the terms of performance, the excuses (such as conditions and defaults),
and who accepts the blame for breach (the indemnities). The lawyer’s
perspective—and related disciplines of contract management and
compliance—is about contract compliance. Compliance with the contract
is what the litigation will be about later. For lawyers lacking the business
perspective of the transaction, the contract is the result of the doctrines
that arose in contract law cases that resulted from gaps in the contracts,
not the result of the transaction in place or in planning. For lawyers, the
drafting and reviewing of a contract is their transaction.
in its equitable powers, will either construct a contract from the facts proven, if sufficient
facts are in fact proven, or impose a contract on the facts proven where such a contract
exists as a matter of law. . . . Common counts is an alternate theory of recovery based on
a contract that is either implied in fact or implied in law. A common count is proper
whenever the plaintiff claims a sum of money due either as an indebtedness in a sum
certain or for the reasonable value of services, goods, etc., furnished.” Id. (citations
omitted).
12

Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1770.
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A business perspective is therefore useful in drafting the contract.
The perspective is also useful—essential, really—to address transactional
risks that do not fit neatly into the lawyer’s blame-shifting concerns.
Understanding transactional risks gives meaning to why a good contract
really does need representations, warranties, covenants, conditions,
amendment, rights, and all the other techniques for drafting a contract.
Otherwise, these drafting techniques13 are merely a taxonomy that give a
nice formality to a contract, and later serve as triggers for blame-shifting.
The business perspective also explains why contracts get amended and
renegotiated: because the transaction changes.
This business perspective is also useful in teaching contract drafting,
a developing subject in some law schools (as this conference and its
previous conferences have been facilitating for several years). The classic
doctrinal contract classes use highly abridged cases to show what went
wrong with contracts, and thus are backward looking—what went wrong,
let’s not get blamed for that again. The contract drafting class should be
forward looking and dynamic14—what is this transaction and how does
the contract support the transaction. The contract should also embody the
guidance of experience from looking backward from case law and
experience to insert provisions (boilerplate, sometimes) that recognize the
efficiency of routines15 and then to buttress some contractual structures
that may prove weak when under pressure later on when things turn out
badly.
Other domains of contract theory and practice can illustrate the need
for forward-looking and dynamic contractual accommodation of
transactional risks, rather than the contract risks of classical contract
theory. Relational contracts: because the parties have long-standing relations
to maintain. Enterprise risk management: because businesspeople have to
consider all risks to the firm, not only the pure operational ones that
typically give rise to first-party losses to property and third-party losses to
other people and their property. Options and incomplete contracts: because
transactions are always in adjustment, thus contracts are not and cannot
be perfect. Contractual management: because contract management is too

13 Finally and ably explained in Tina Stark’s essential book to teach contract drafting,
Drafting Contracts: How and Why Lawyers Do What They Do, the canon for teaching
contracting drafting. It is also worth noting that the book does include commentary on
the risk shifting concerns of contracts.
14

Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 1796.

15

Smith & King, supra note 5, at 29–33.
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limited to compliance with the contract requirements rather than the
realities of the transaction.
III.

RELATIONAL CONTRACTS – DOCTRINE TAKES A HIT

The theory of relational contracts was conceived by Stewart Macaulay
from his study in 1963 of business practices while trying to understand
how to teach contracts. It was an empirical study of real contracts and
practices,16 a rare idea in the legal doctrinal academy (although economists
showed some interest).17 Smith and King explain how this study came to
be:
When Stewart Macaulay began teaching Contracts at the
University of Wisconsin Law School in 1957, he was twenty-six
years old. He had never practiced law, and he did the sensible
thing by adopting the casebook used by his more experienced
colleagues: Lon Fuller, Basic Contract Law. Macaulay's fatherin-law—Jack Ramsey, the retired General Manager of S.C.
Johnson & Son—was not impressed with the casebook.
According to Macaulay, Ramsey “thought that much of it rested
on a picture of the business world that was so distorted that it
was silly.”
To assist Macaulay in gaining real-world perspectives on
contracts, Ramsey arranged for a series of meetings with
corporate executives that became the basis of Macaulay's
seminal article, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study. As indicated by the title, Macaulay focused
on noncontractual relations—how parties regulated their
behavior without the assistance of written contracts.18
Macaulay studied sixty-eight businessmen and lawyers representing
forty-three companies and six law firms. The study stressed, “among other
things, the functions and dysfunctions of using contract to solve exchange
problems and the influence of occupational roles on how one assesses
whether the benefits of using contract outweigh the costs.”19 His study
found that sales people typically did not know what the boilerplate
provisions on the back of the purchasing orders were about (the
16

Macaulay, supra note 4, at 468.

Smith & King, supra note 5, at 19–24; Ian R. MacNeil, Relational Contract: What We Do
and Do Not Know, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 483, 508–09 (1985).

17

18

Smith & King, supra note 5, at 7–8 (citations omitted).

19

Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC.
55–56 (1963).

REV. 55,
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purchasing orders seemed more for the accounting department than for
the legal department),20 that an acknowledgement by the seller could be
on a form having significantly different provisions than the buyer’s form
without ever agreeing on which form controlled,21 that a manufacturer’s
own audit of its contracts found that from 1953 through 1956 the contract
terms were never agreed upon between 59.5% and 75% of the time,22 and
disputes were “frequently settled without reference to the contract or
potential actual legal sanctions.”23
Contract planning and contract law, at best, stand at the margin
of important long-term continuing business relations. Business
people often do not plan, exhibit great care in drafting contracts, pay
much attention to those that lawyers carefully draft, or honor a legal
approach to business relationships. There are business cultures
defining the risks assumed in bargains, and what should be done
when things go wrong. People perform disadvantageous contracts
today because often this gains credit that they can draw on in the
future. People often renegotiate deals that have turned out badly for
one or both sides. They recognize a range of excuses much broader
than those accepted in most legal systems.24
Ian McNeil is the other leading scholar on relational contracts and the
temporal spectrum that these transactions embody. Paul Gudel
summarizes the view:
[T]he participants never intend or expect to see the whole future
of the relation as presentiated [sic] at any single time, but view
the relation as an ongoing integration of behavior to grow and
vary with events in a largely unforeseeable future . . . . It follows
that planning for relational contracts is often tentative rather
than entirely binding and often involves not simply the
substance of the exchange, as in discrete transactions, but also
planning of structures and processes to govern the relation in
the future.25
20

Id. at 58.

21

Id. at 59.

22

Id. at 60.

23

Id. at 61.

24

Macaulay, supra note 4, at 467–68.

Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange, 46 BUFF. L. REV. 763,
765 (1998) (quoting IAN R. MACNEIL, CONTRACTS: EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS AND
RELATIONS 13 (2d ed. 1978)).
25
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This brings us back to the focus on the transaction rather than the
contract. As Macaulay explained of his research, “In most situations
contract is not needed. Often its functions are served by other devices. . .
. Although the parties fail to cover all foreseeable contingencies, they will
exercise care to see that both understand the primary obligation on each
side.”26 Further, buyers and purchasing agents have personal relations and
“something to give the other,” and “Both business units involved in the
exchange desire to continue successfully in business and will avoid
conduct which might interfere with attaining this goal. One is concerned
with both the reaction of the other party in the particular exchange and
with his own general business reputation.”27 Thus, as Macaulay wrote later
in 2006, the norms of mediation and arbitration and alternative dispute
resolution evolved for most types of disputes.28
One might smile at the old-fashioned custom of these businesses and
their disfavor of litigation to resolve contract disputes due to costs and the
severing of relationships,29 but another contracts professor found a similar
distain of contracts and contract details when she presented at a
conference of purchasing managers in 1995.30 The contract then might
oftentimes seem to be more important for setting expectations and as
symbolic and ceremonial value.31 If that is the case, then we are back to
classical contract doctrines that focus on the contract without addressing
the place of contracts in transactions.
Given the difference between the transaction and the formal contract,
drafters of contracts (and their instructors) should keep in mind that the
26

Macaulay, supra note 20, at 62.

27

Id. at 62–63.

Stewart Macaulay, Contracts, New Legal Realism, and Improving the Navigation of The Yellow
Submarine, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1161, 1170 (2006); see, e.g., Yehuda Adar & Moshe Gelbard,
The Role of Remedies in The Relational Theory of Contract: A Preliminary Inquiry, 3 EUR. REV.
CONT. L. 399 (2011) (although it is not relevant to this paper, this source discusses the
question of how to deal with legal remedies, and their relevance, in the relational contract
scheme); see also Omri Ben-Shahar, “Agreeing to Disagree”: Filling Gaps in Deliberately
Incomplete Contracts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 389 (2004) (addressing this problem with
incomplete contracts).

28

29

Macaulay, supra note 20, at 64–65.

Marianne M. Jennings, The True Meaning of Relational Contracts: We Don’t Care About the
Mailbox Rule, Mirror Images, or Consideration Anymore—Are We Safe?, 73 DENV. U. L. REV.
3 (1995).

30

Robert C. Illig, The Dog that Didn’t Bark: Private Investment Funds and Relational Contracts
in the Wake of the Great Recession, 2 MICH. BUS. & ENTREPRENEURIAL L. REV. 49, 78, 81–
83, 85 (2012).

31
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transaction is the focus and goal, and the contract must support that.
Business changes, transactions change, the contract must have flexibility
and reflect these realities.
IV.
TRANSACTIONAL RISKS AND ENTERPRISE RISK
MANAGEMENT – MINDFUL OF EVERYTHING THAT CAN GO
WRONG IN THE BUSINESS
Business transactions also have risks, again meaning uncertainties. In
the domains of finance and enterprise risk management, the risks might
be positive (we make money) or negative (we lose money), and thus the
businesspeople must assess and anticipate the obstacles to their own
performance, and the obstacles to the counterparty’s performance. Will
we be able to obtain the raw materials and components at the price we
expect in the time we expect and have the right labor to achieve this? Do
we have the resources, can we obtain them? What opportunities do we
give up, what opportunities will we gain? Will the other side have the
resources and ability and incentive to perform? Will both parties have the
financial ability to perform, and to sustain themselves if the other side fails
to perform? What can go wrong before, during and after? What are those
impacts? These are business process questions that the businessperson
must work out and plan for. If the likelihood of success is greater than the
likelihood of failure, and the rate of return is adequate to generate a profit,
then do the transaction, otherwise skip it.
Short-term fixed price contracts put more of the risk on the seller,
who must deliver a product or service by a specified time within a specified
price; at least here the input prices are likely known when entering into the
contract. Long-term fixed price contracts probably split the risk between
seller and buyer, because the long-term input prices might vary a lot up or
down over the time period, to either side’s benefit or detriment, and if
research and development are needed, these too may be uncertain. Longterm cost-plus (or cost-reimbursement plus profit) contracts put more risk
on the buyer, who has little control over the final and multiple input costs,
and may never see a product delivered or delivered anywhere near the
initial anticipated price due to cost-overruns32—although these types of
contracts may make most sense for research and development programs
than for actual deliverable products.
If the transaction succeeds—meaning here the contract was
performed—what happens if one of the parties seek to continue it, to buy
more stuff, to continue to contract for services? From a legal perspective,
32 See generally Yong Woon Kim & Trevor L. Brown, The Importance of Contract Design, 72
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 687, 689–90 (2012).
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this is either another contract or an amendment, or the exercise of an
option or right. But other commitments by one party may be an obstacle
to doing more, consequently disappointment and default looms or prices
might have to increase to meet this expanded transaction. This is yet
another uncertainty (risk) both sides might need to anticipate; the inability
to perform more because of the new demand, which should count as
success, not failure, although now failure is the right word. Yet had the
party planned for such higher levels and the demand did not materialize,
then the investment would be a loss.
These are the challenges of looking at risk as uncertainty and looking
at risk holistically. Enterprise risk management is the concept that
syntheses all the firm’s risks—operational, financial, speculative
(business)—to look at interrelationships among them, and identify
correlations where a risk in one area may amplify a loss in another area.33
ERM “attempts to manage all risks, including operational and reputational
risks that normally cannot be hedged. It is this examination of all risks
facing the firm and the attempt to manage the risks in a holistic manner
that separates ERM from traditional silo-based risk management.”34 The
theory of ERM is that by integrating risk management and related
decision-making across the entire organization, companies can avoid
duplication of expenses and can consolidate hedging, insurance
purchasing and other mitigation efforts. With integrated, enterprise-wide
data on risk, companies should be able to make better resource allocation
decisions and improve capital efficiency and return on equity.35 Because
the focus of ERM is now to manage risk from an integrated approach, the
focus of risk management has shifted “from primarily defensive to
increasingly offensive and strategic.”36

See ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT §§ 1.3–1.4 (Michael W. Elliot ed., 2014); SIM
SEGAL, CORPORATE VALUE OF ENTERPRISE RISK MANAGEMENT 24–29 (1st ed. 2011);
Nadine Gatzert & Michael Martin, Determinants and Value of Enterprise Risk Management;
Empirical Evidence from the Literature, 18 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 29, 32 (2015); What is
ERM?,
RISK
MGMT.
SOC’Y,
https://www.rims.org/resources/ERM/Pages/WhatisERM.aspx (last visited Sept. 19,
2018).

33

Donald Pagach & Richard Warr, The Characteristics of Firms that Hire Chief Risk Officers,
78 J. RISK & INS. 185, 188 (2011).

34

Robert E. Hoyt & Andre P. Liebenberg, The Value of Enterprise Risk Management, 78 J.
RISK & INS. 795, 795–796 (2011).

35

Andre P. Leibenberg & Robert E. Hoyt, The Determinants of Enterprise Risk Management:
Evidence from the Appointment of Chief Risk Officers, 6 RISK MGMT. & INS. REV. 37, 40 (2003);
Gatzert & Martin, supra note 34, at 32.

36
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This is the role of the chief risk officer. The lawyers mostly still deal
with liability risks due to failure to perform and thus causing a first-party
loss to the firm, whose “reasonable” or “reliance” expectations were not
met, and deal with third-party losses when injuries result to other people.
These mostly arise from the operational risk: something went wrong.
But some chief legal officers (in-house counsel, primarily), have
moved into addressing, or at least being sensitive to, the full spectrum of
risks whether these are transferable by contracts or insurance.37 This inside
understanding of the full spectrum of transactional risks also means a
keener appreciation of the whole dynamic spectrum of the transactions
and the place of contracts within that spectrum rather than as pinnacle of
the deal. Simmons and Dinnage provide the best account of the many
ways that in-house counsel perform different, more strategic, and more
holistic work for a firm:
Generally, in-house counsel function in a strategic capacity
whereas outside counsel primarily play a tactical role.”38
....
In-house counsel have the distinct advantage of
understanding this business context and choosing among a
range of tactics to achieve inter-temporal business objectives.39
....
The role of in-house counsel is not simply to promote
compliance with the law, but also to assist corporations with
their broader objectives and strategies on an ongoing basis. To
be clear, a lawyer must understand the relevant business context
in order to adequately detect and solve problems. . . . In-house
counsel do not operate in a legal vacuum but must consistently
weigh both legal and business concerns in a dynamic
environment plagued with uncertainty.40
37 Margaret B. Sherman et al., Risky Business: Managing Risk in a Complex and Connected World
159–73, 2ème Assises de l’enseignement et de la recherche en droit dans les grandes
écoles, Troyes, France (forthcoming No. 74, 2014); Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too)
Comfortable: In-house Lawyers, Enterprise Risk and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495
(2012); Omari Scott Simmons & James D. Dinnage, Innkeepers: A Unifying Theory of the InHouse Counsel Role, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 77 (2011); Robert E. Rosen, The Inside Counsel
Movement, Professional Judgment and Organizational Representation, 64 IND. L.J. 479 (1989).
38

Simmons & Dinnage, supra note 38, at 113.

39

Id. at 117.

40

Id. at 141.
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This insight into the transaction as existential purpose, rather than the
contract as purpose, becomes another connection to relational contract
theory.
This also means that contracts should be drafted mindful of these
transactional risks, some of which can be addressed in contract, some of
which cannot. A party’s ability to expand the contract can be an option, a
right, or a condition (which may depend on some external verifiable
event41). A party’s ability to end a contract can be an option, a right, a
condition, an effect of default, or the failure of a representation or
covenant. What is needed for the transaction is what goes into the
contract—maybe. What is needed for the contract might not be part of
the transaction. Understanding the business flow, transactional risks, and
enterprise risk management allows the contract to be functional rather
than merely formal. Being functional, the drafting techniques of
conditions, covenants, etc., have purpose rather than being merely a
formal taxonomy of things that go into contracts.
Even using enterprise risk management analysis does not eliminate all
risks. Some risks are nontransferable. Some are ordinary business risks.
Some will fall back to the party even with the best indemnity provision
against the other side, where the other side is unable to meet that
indemnity obligation. This is why indemnity provisions are backed up by
insurance. But even getting these two sections right is hard. The wrong
insurance might be specified, or the wrong insurance obtained, or the
particular exposure is excluded from the policy by an endorsement or the
failure to remove an exclusion that one or both parties did not realize, or
the policy is exhausted by other claims leaving it empty when our client’s
claim is tendered to the insurer. Or the indemnity section and the
insurance section may be badly integrated, so the insurance does not fully
cover the indemnity, or the indemnity is limited by the insurance available
under the additional insured coverage. Then the indemnity fails and the
insurance fails, and the risk is back on our client.

Keith J. Crocker & Scott E. Masten, Mitigating Contractual Hazards: Unilateral Options and
Contract Length, 19 RAND J. ECON. 327, 329 (1988) (“One way in which parties provide
for low-cost adaptation to changing circumstances is by using unilateral options. Whereas
contingent clauses require both the parties and the courts to establish the state that has
actually transpired, properly authorized orders and receipts may be all that is necessary
to verify that an option has been invoked and its terms fulfilled.”).

41
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INCOMPLETE CONTRACTS AND OPTIONS – THEORY,
REALITY AND APPLICATION

This insufficiency of contracts to address everything, and the reality
of contract limitations for the transaction, brings us to the economic
theory of incomplete contracts and the finance theory of options. These
are theories we can use to enhance the understanding of the limitations of
the classical legal contract doctrine for transactions and transactional risks,
by reconsidering the law’s view that the contract is the transaction—the
parties wrote their deal and now must follow the contract. In incomplete
contracts theory, the contract provides a reference point for the parties’
trading relationship.42 First we must realize that lawyers and economists
mean different things when they talk about incomplete contracts.
Legal scholars use the term “incomplete contracting” to
refer to contracts in which the obligations are not fully specified.
A contract to sell a good would be “obligationally” incomplete,
for example, if it failed to specify the price, quantity, or date of
delivery. In contrast, a contract is obligationally complete if the
obligations of the parties are fully specified for all future states
of the world. A contract that failed to specify the seller's
obligations in the event of a flood or the buyer's breach would
thus be obligationally incomplete. Default rules respond to
obligational incompleteness by filling these obligational gaps.
Economics scholars, on the other hand, use the term
“incomplete contracting” to refer to contracts that fail to fully
realize the potential gains from trade in all states of the world.
These contracts are considered “contingently” incomplete or
“insufficiently state contingent.”43
Actual contracts, “as lawyers have realized for a long time . . . are
poorly worded, ambiguous, and leave out important things. They are
incomplete.”44 Well, some contracts are poorly worded, often when
written by the parties themselves, frequently when written by lawyers not
skilled in contract drafting. Even the best written contracts cannot
possibly provide for every imaginable and unimaginable situation

42

Oliver Hart & John Moore, Contracts as Reference Points, 123 Q.J. ECON. 1, 3 (2008).

43 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal
Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 730 (1992).
44

liver Hart, Incomplete Contracts and Control, 107 AMER. ECON. REV. 1731, 1732 (2017).
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(exigencies, as I call them), thus an “optimal contract is incomplete.”45
Incomplete contracts can lead to problems later when the parties need to
change things and one party has superior bargaining ability, what theory
calls the “hold-up” problem.46 The hold-up problem can be addressed by
diversifying reliance on that customer, both operationally and
strategically.47 This is a basic risk management technique, an enterprise risk
management technique, as well as an economic technique. The contract
cannot fully address this transactional risk, but a contract built to
accommodate the transactional risk of hold-up (as the economists call it),
and options (as the finance discipline calls something similar), can put
boundaries on the negotiations and the price ranges,48 and can even put a
price on the exercise of that option, which would give “both parties a piece
of the upside, but would still leave them with the flexibility to adapt.”49
Lawyers would call this an exercisable right, perhaps triggered by a
condition. (The unilateral adjustment—termination, mostly—of a
contract is a breach, for which the unstated and unbargained for default
“option” price is benefit of the bargain (performance) damages, 50 which
defeats the other party’s perhaps greater interest and reliance of
performance.51)
Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD.
115, 116 (1999).

45

46

Hart, supra note 45, at 1732–33.

Id. at 1733. Hart uses economic terminology rather than risk management and
enterprise risk management terminology.

47

Nabil I. Al-Najjar, Incomplete Contracts and the Governance of Complex Contractual
Relationships, 85 AMER. ECON. REV. 432, 432 (1995).

48

49

Victor P. Goldberg, Protecting Reliance, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1033, 1045 (2014).

Paul. G. Mahoney, Contract Remedies and Options Pricing, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 139, 140
(1995) (“[T]he availability of money damages is tantamount to granting the promisor (or
Seller) an option to buy back his performance by paying an amount of money awarded
by the court.”).

50

Used this way, option theory is like adding an implied additional clause; yet the
consequence is that “true breach never happens unless the promisor neither delivers nor
pays damages.” Michael D. Knobler, A Dual Approach to Contract Remedies, 30 YALE L. &
POL’Y REV. 415, 418 (2012). The promisor’s decision to breach and pay damages is
“presumptively rational, and allowing the promisor to choose between performance and
so-called efficient breach allows for maximization of gains from trade.” Id. at 421.
Goldberg, supra note 50, at 1038. This also leads to questions of good faith
performance, the implied duty of good faith, and willful misconduct. Id. at 1063–65. This
also leads to the economic doctrine of “efficient breach,” which has many problems
fitting within contract doctrine, and problems when juxtaposed with relational contract
theory, and is a topic for another paper.

51
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The theories of incomplete contracts and options provide a better
understanding of why contracts are not static and need to adjust to the
transaction that has generated the contract. As Hart and Moore state, the
contract then is a reference for the situations that governs later feelings of
entitlement, limits their disagreements, and provides for flexibility.52
Making rigid contracts has its own problems because it may be impossible
to adapt to unforeseen events.53 A fixed contract for a future performance,
when things change a lot, can be wasteful, and result in lost investments;
it may therefore be better to make the contract contingent before all the
expense of (impossibly) acquiring all the perfect and complete knowledge
about the future to make the contract complete.54 These incomplete
contracts in economic terms are about contingencies of economic
efficiency, not about missing terms for performance as lawyers understand
them.55 Having flexibility allows for renegotiation after uncertainty
dissolves.
From the perspective of lawyers and legal scholars, therefore, the
most important contribution of economic contract theory is arguably
this systematic incorporation of renegotiation and its feedback effects
into the analysis of contracting. Contract theory now examines the
promisor's strategy among three options: performance, breach, or
renegotiation. From this perspective, a contract sets the field for
future renegotiation of the terms of exchange after uncertainty has
been resolved. As noted above, a challenge for parties designing
contracts is to preordain or at least constrain the course of future
renegotiation so as to yield both ex ante and ex post efficiency.56
All of which sounds good until we are back to the hold-up problem
of the cost and renegotiating and the risks of renegotiating. This problem
can be solved by granting a party a right to do something, whether expand
or contract the scope or extend or shorten the performance: this legal right
is the finance idea of options, specifically real options. The use of options
in real estate is familiar to real estate lawyers, as an option to purchase
Hart & Moore, supra note 43, at 32. Ulrika Badenfelt, Fixing the Contract After the Contract
is Fixed: A Study of Incomplete Contracts in IT and Construction Projects, 29 INT’L J. PROJECT
MGMT. 568 (2011).
52

Mathias Erlei & Christian Reinhold, Contracts as Reference Points—The Role of Reciprocity
Effects and Signaling Effects, 127 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 133 (2016).
53

Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts and the Theory of Contract Design,
56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187, 189–90 (2005).
54

55

Id. at 190.

56

Id. at 194.
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(being an extended offer if a stand-alone contract, thus requiring
consideration), as an option to purchase during or following a lease, and
as an option to expand the lease such as to as a right of first refusal on
additional space to lease.57 Lawyers may also be aware of options in traded
securities, primarily puts and calls and complex variations of those,
although the principal concern there is valuation.58 “The value of real
options lies in the enhanced ability of the firm to cope with exogenous
uncertainty.”59 Real options, as distinct from the financial options of stock
options, refer to investments in real assets, “which confer on the firm the
right, but not the obligation, to undertake certain actions in the future.”60
Real options in business plans “enable firms to reduce downside risk while
accessing upside opportunities” because of “the discretionary decision
rights that options create, i.e., the right to select an outcome in the future
on if it is favorable.”61 Meaning changes, and sometimes the uncertainty
of profitability, is resolved along the way to show either to proceed with
the project or abandon it.62 Real options give the parties flexibility to
modify a contract where changes in business activity may require
“managers [to] exercise investment timing, abandonment, or temporary
shutdown options . . . [or] the capability to switch among alternative inputs
and outputs,”63 or to stage investments or alter scale.64
Most short- and medium-term contingencies should be addressed in
the contract, while long-term contingencies should probably be set aside

1 MILLER AND STARR CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE §§ 2:11, 10:117 (4th ed. 2015); 2
RASCH’S LANDLORD & TENANT INCLUDING SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS § 20:1 (5th ed.);
GEORGIA REAL ESTATE SALES CONTRACTS § 14:2 (6th ed.).

57

See generally LAWRENCE G. MCMILLAN, OPTIONS AS A STRATEGIC INVESTMENT (5th
ed. 2012), in particular the discussion of the Black-Scholes model of pricing options in
chapter 28.

58

Nalin Kulatilaka, The Value of Flexibility: A General Model of Real Options, in REAL
OPTIONS IN CAPITAL INVESTMENT 91(Lenos Trigeorgis ed., 1995).

59

Tony W. Tong & Jeffrey J. Reuer, Real Options in Strategic Management, in REAL OPTIONS
THEORY 5 (Jeffrey J. Reuer & Tony W. Tong eds., 2007).

60

Id. at 11. The ability to invest further or expand the contract might be thought of as a
call option, and the ability to disinvest or pull out of a contract or investment might be
thought of as a put option. Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, Expandability,
Reversibility, and Optimal Capacity Choice, in PROJECT FLEXIBILITY, AGENCY, AND
COMPETITION 50–51 (Michael J. Brennan & Lenos Trigeorgis eds., 2000).

61

62

Kulatilaka, supra note 60, at 100–01; Trigeorgis, supra note 62, at 2.

63

Kulatilaka, supra note 60, at 90.

64

Trigeoris, supra note 62, at 3–9.
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due to uncertainty.65 Some contingencies are so remote (what I call
exigencies) that it makes no practical sense to plan for them. That is how
business works. The pragmatic adjustment to the situation requires
renegotiation, and renegotiations lead to contract amendments, or
novation of the existing contract and replacement with a new one.
VI.

CONTRACTS NEED TO ACCOMMODATE THE RANGE OF
TRANSACTION RISKS

Lawyers who draft contracts but lack close knowledge of the client’s
business, and law students learning the methods of contract drafting, are
likely to know little of the business process. When drafters lack insight
into the business process, they draft contracts that look more like technical
challenges that float above the dirty business of business. Put in the
standard representations so we can walk away later. Make everything a
covenant so we can show default. Add conditions so the parties can walk
away without defaults. Boilerplate follows, sometimes gained from prior
bad transactions that led to changes, oftentimes gained from prior
transactions that never had a problem and therefore the boilerplate was
ignored and perpetuated, causing no harm to the parties or the lawyers,
until the deficiency finally erupts. The standard provisions are a taxonomy
of things to insert and assure a contract is upheld by the courts, rather than
serving a true functional purpose to the transaction.66
Lawyers typically look at the transaction as an end-result of failure
risks, either failure to perform for which damages are owed, or a failure to
avert negligence and harm, thus creating liability risk for which blame is to
be shifted. This is the litigation end of things, where risk is blame, not
uncertainty. This gives rise to legal remedies like benefit of the bargain,
economic loss rule, liquidated damages, limitations of liability, and
indemnity. These remedies, taken from experience in contract failures, are
then inserted into the contract drafting, making them contract risks. And
that’s it, the lawyers shifted the blame risk.
But from the beginning, the business people have to deal with the
business process risks and transactional risks to keep the process moving,
for both sides’ benefits. These are the relationships, and the economic and
65 Steven R. Salbu, Evolving Contract as a Device for Flexible Coordination and Control, 34 AM.
BUS. L.J. 329, 341–43 (1997) (calling the situation “contingent contracting”); Keith J.
Crocker & Kenneth J. Reynolds, The Efficiency of Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis
of Air Force Engine Procurement, 24 RAND J. ECON. 126, 127–29 (1993).

The idea of contracts, and many aspects of the law, being defined in classical legal
doctrine as doctrines and expectations of what a court will uphold, rather than serving a
truly functional purpose, is expounded in Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the
Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1935), in particular, pages 820–29, 839–41.
66
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business realities. The contract deals with short- and medium-term
contingencies and uncertainties and serves as reference point for the
ongoing transaction, which can span years.
These contractual remedies to shift blame are not why we have all
those other things in the contract. Those other things should reflect and
arise out of the broader risks of uncertainty in the transaction and how to
get the transaction done or be ready when the transaction is not done. If
we view the contract as supporting the business process, rather than the
reason for the business process, then the technical things we put into
contracts make more sense to the businessperson and to the lawyers.
These transactional risks are why we use the contractual provisions of
representations (what induces the one party to make the contract with this
other party), conditions (the what-ifs the parties need to have, or need to
avoid, or need to stop), warranties (representations as to the future, like
guarantees, as Tina Stark describes them,67 or representations that abate
reliance that a representation otherwise requires to be enforceable or
grounds to rescind, as courts look at warranties particularly in applications
for insurance68), covenants, opportunities to cure (how do we keep going),
options (conditions that allow a party to expand or contract the
transaction, or extend or cancel the contract), standards and specifications
(what the performance must exactly achieve, stated as declarations in the
contract or possibly covenants rather than mushy legal incantations of
“reasonable,” which lawyers insert based on law school training and
oblivious to the fact that engineers and specialists and technical standardssetting organizations have a precise meaning for things to be done for
performance), audit and compliance (rights to assure the standards and
specifications are being met69), all of which are necessary so the parties

Stark, supra note 14, at 142; see, e.g., In re Hardieplank Fiber Cement Siding Litig., No.
12-md-2359, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90, at *51 (D. Minn. Jan. 2, 2018); CBS v. Ziff-Davis
Pub. Co., 75 N.Y.2d 496, 501 (1990).

67

DAVID B. GOODWIN, P. BENJAMIN DUKE & R. GREGORY RUBIO, 5 NEW APPLEMAN
ON INSURANCE LAW LIBRARY EDITION § 41.04 (2018). Stark also notes this possibility:

68

“A party may also warrant that a state of facts will exist in the future. It may do so because
the issue of the recipient’s justifiable reliance disappears with respect to a warranty.”
Stark, supra note 14, at 142.
“Compliance is the process by which an organization adheres to its internal policies
and procedures and to its external legal and regulatory requirements.” Elliot, supra note
34, at 8.8. “Although both functions [compliance and internal audit] are involved with
assessing risk, they do it from different perspectives. Compliance primarily assesses
regulatory and legal compliance risk, while internal audit performs risk-based audits that
assess internal controls.” Id.

69
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themselves can manage the transactional risks and get the transaction to
the finish line.
Schuhmann and Eichhorn move the focus from the contract to the
contractual relationship and the contractual process. “Its goal is to
enhance management with the help of the contract and not, as in contract
management, to ensure an optimal management of the contract.”70 “[T]he
contract must work as an element of risk management, transaction, and
knowledge management throughout its entire life cycle.”71 Looking at
contracts as contract management, or project management, can reflect
both compliance problems and flexibility opportunities.72 Looking at
contracts as contractual management, as they call it, “integrated into the
relevant corporate processes throughout its entire life cycle,”73 presents a
different role of the contract—how business uses the contract rather than
how lawyers make a contract under classical contract doctrine—which
brings in these other domains of enterprise risk management, risk
management, corporate governance, and compliance management.74
The lawyer who appreciates the transactional risks and the business
realities will draft a contract that fits within that transaction, use drafting
techniques with functional business purpose rather than boilerplate, and
appreciate that the parties will operate in furtherance of the transaction
rather than to the details of the contract and only look to the contract
when things fall apart. That is the challenge in drafting the contract: the
lawyer does not want to be blamed for missing something, the parties do
not want to be blamed for performance failure or harm, the lawyer may
not understand the deal, and the parties may not understand the contract.
But we can still write a better contract, placed within the transaction, and
be accommodative of the transactional uncertainties, even if economically
incomplete.
VII.

IMPLICATIONS FOR TEACHING CONTRACT DRAFTING

Teaching contract drafting is about learning techniques of drafting,
but that is only technique. How do these techniques apply to transactions?
Here, creating scenarios to draft a contract, as might a lawyer with only a
few years of experience, can serve as case studies in what to do. It can
force students to think of the business process and the deal flow, and the
70

Schuhman & Eichhorn, supra note 2, at 18 (italics omitted).

71

Id. at 18.

72

Id. at 7–8.
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Id. at 11.

74

Id. at 8–9.
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decision tree logic that requires the technique: if X happens, then is that a
right, a condition, a default? What representations do we really care about?
What happens if they fail? What are the contingencies of this transaction
and are they better handled as rights or conditions? Defaults make more
sense when we link them to whether the parties really want to continue
and get back on the road, or whether they really intend to give up the ride
and get off.
Thus, for both understanding the role of the contract, how to draft
it, and how to teach drafting it, the lawyer must look at the transaction and
transactional risks, and how the contract fits in that world, rather than how
the contract fits within the contract world. The drafting techniques must
serve a function to the transaction, not merely a function to assuring a
legally enforceable contract unhinged to the transaction.

